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Adrian Leftwich has recently identified two problems
that assail the study of Third World politics. First,
there has been 'a drift away from some of the
fundamental questions to do with the role of power,
politics and the state', so that in studies of the Third
World, the discipline of politics has 'to some extent
lost its way'. Second, the reluctance of many western
governments and international aid agencies to
consider the political dimension in their policy studies
has distanced political analysts from research
exposure to the role of politics and the state in the
development process.'
These two problems are related but different, and they
need to be tackled in different ways. Political analysts
at IDS are at work on both fronts. The second
problem is being addressed through research on the
'developmental state' in various Third World settings.
This Bulletin arises out of an effort to address the first
problem by redirecting the attention of political
scientists to fundamental questions such as those
outlined above.
To some extent, these two initiatives take us in
opposite directions. The work on the developmental
state carries researchers deeper into development
studies, while the work on fundamental political
questions represents something of a withdrawal -
however temporary. But both are essential if the study
of Third World politics is to possess the clarity and
coherence that it needs to play a useful role in
development studies, or just to maintain intellectual
respectability. The increasingly widespread recognition
that politics matters in development outcomes2 only
adds urgency to these initiatives.
As part of our attempt to tackle fundamental
questions in the study of Third World politics, the IDS
and the German Foundation for International
Development jointly organised a conference in Berlin
in July, 1989. It was attended by political scientists
from Europe and the Third World - from Britain,
France, Germany, the Soviet Union, China, Thailand,
Bangladesh, India, Cameroon, and Chile. The
participants were drawn from a range of methodo-
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logical traditions, schools of thought and sub-fields
within Third World political studies. This Bulletin
contains several of the papers presented there. A fuller
set will appear in a book to be published soon.3
All of those who took part were keenly aware that the
two paradigms or schools of thought that have
dominated the field over the last quarter-century now
face severe difficulties. The first of these - the
'political development' school - yielded important
insights, but its expectations of a unilinear pattern of
change, and of covergence among less developed
nations were misplaced. It also tended to create
models which presumed more equilibrium and fewer
contradictions in polities and societies than were
there. It often emphasised stability at the expense of
change and social justice. Many in this school made
simplistic contrasts between 'tradition' and
'modernity', and tended to underestimate the diversity
among Third World countries, the importance of
political economy within nations and of the
international economic order.
The second, 'dependency' school also taught us much
that was valuable, but it emphasised the importance of
economic forces - especially international forces -
at the expense both of politics and of the varied
cultural and historical particularities within nations.
Its preoccupation with class as an analytical category
underplayed the importance of indigenous or hybrid
social institutions. It was useful in analysing small
countries which depended heavily on the export of one
or two primary commodities, but it was less adequate
at assessing larger, more complex political economies.
It neither anticipated nor explained the ris of newly
industrialising countries on the 'periphery' of the
international economic system, or the re-emergence of
liberal political regimes in places like India after the
Emergency and Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile
in the 1980s.4
Our purpose is not to formulate a new paradigm. That
may eventually be necessary, but we prefer to set it to
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one side for the time being. We are reacting against the
old paradigms which distorted our understanding of
events in Third World polities as much as they
advanced it. Both the 'political development' and
'dependency' schools approached political systems in
search of structural determinants which in our view
were seldom present. In their eagerness to set agendas
for Third World regimes, members of the two schools
were often distracted from learning what was actually
happening within and around those regimes. With
their teleological biases, they tended to begin their
studies with the script already half-written. The old
paradigms were ideologies as much as they were
modes of analysis. They tended towards monopolistic
claims of truth for their own world view. We make no
such claim - indeed, we are not seeking to present a
single world view - and this means that our map of
the discipline of politics looks rather different from
theirs.
We are attempting here to clear our heads by returning
to a few basic questions. What has been happening in
Third World political institutions arid processes in
recent years? What has been happening, first in terms
of political practice, and second in the ways that
people conceive of and speak about politics? Finally,
how do we find out what has been happening? If new,
more satisfactory paradigms are to be devised, or if
analysts of Third World politics are to make a useful
contribution to development studies, then we need
clearer answers to these questions.
Our aim, in addressing these issues, was to be
provocative rather than definitive. We neither sought
nor achieved a unanimity of view, but we were
surprised at the degree of consensus that emerged. We
were in broad agreement not only on the inadequacies
of the old paradigms, but on numerous other matters,
three of which are worth mentioning. First, we agreed
about the need to pay attention to change over time -
to recent political trajectories, and often to the longer-
term historical background. It is insufficient to focus
only or mainly on the condition of a political system in
one brief phase.
That initial consensus was not, perhaps, too surprising
given the number of participants from Europe where
the fields of history and politics intersect far more than
in most North American universities. But we were well
nigh astonished to discover the extent to which many
of us were preoccupied with the theatrical and
imaginary dimensions of politics5 - and to find that a
concern with these issues united people studying such
contrasting political systems as Communist China and
West African cases like Togo and Cameroon.
On the decline of these paradigms, see for example. T. Smith,
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It is of course true that the cultural particularities in
such different settings vary enormously, so that the
content of political theatre and imaginings will vary
markedly from case to case. The symbols and
theatrical devices used by the Tiananmen protesters
were not at all like he images of witchcraft and
devouring used by Cameroonians when they think and
speak about politics.6 But the importance of the
theatrical and imaginary dimensions - and of
political discourse more broadly, another major
concern of our papers - is common to all cultural
settings.
We were again surprised to see consensus developing
round another issue - the tendency for incongruous
or contradictory elements to co-exist uneasily in
curious hybrids, which change shape from time to
time, but which seldom give way to enduring syntheses
in the way that analysts working in both the Marxist
and Weberian traditions too often expect. No sooner
had the Africa and Asia specialists at the conference
agreed among themselves that this tendency was a
feature of their regions but not of Latin America, than
a Chilean participant protested that his region should
not be excluded.
The five papers included here cover a wide range of
issues and cases. They move - overlapping somewhat
at times - from discussions of how we might analyse
the state and politics, to assessments of how political
actors (in both elite and mass) think and speak about
politics, and how their thinking, imagining and
discourse shapes and is shaped by political structures.
They then move on to detailed examinations of
institutions, political practice and state-society
relations.
Chai-Anan Samudavanija's article offers a critique of
much used approaches to the study of Third World
politics - especially, though not only, the 'political
development' or 'modernisation' school. He raises a
number of issues, three of which are worth noting
here. First, he criticises the tendency to conceive of
Third World politics in terms of dichotomies, to think
in binary terms ofjust two sets of categories. Examples
of this include the juxtaposition of 'modern' and
'traditional' forces, or of 'democratic' and 'non-
democratic' political systems. Studies of the relation-
ship between economic and political development also
betray this tendency. He finds that this leads to
simplistic and excessively tidy analyses.
Politics in less developed countries is more complicated
than that. To make sense of these complexities, he
proposes that we use at least three variables - that we
think in terms of a three-dimensional state. He fixes
upon politicians' preoccupations with three things:
security, development and participation. The resulting
analytical model is considerably more complex and
6 On the latter, see A. Mbembe, 'Power and Obscenity in the Post-
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flexible than those based on dyads. He then uses the
model to remind us that most Third World leaders are
usually more concerned with security - their own
political and personal security, and that of their
regimes - than with economic development or
participation. This hugely important point is often
underplayed in discussions of Third World politics,
not least when the role of the state in development is
being assessed.
Chai-Anan also raises questions about the way in
which patterns of change are conceptualised by many
of those who have worked within both the 'political
development' school and the Marxist tradition. He is
uncomfortable with the notion that change tends to
occur when two opposing forces interact in a
dialectical mode - thesis, antithesis and synthesis.
Many of the actual processes of change that he has
studied do not result in neat syntheses. Instead, change
tends to involve adjustment and coexistence between
opposing forces rather than conflict playing itself out
through a dialectical process. Change tends not to
produce a single enduring synthesis. Polities and
societies tend to contain incongruous mixtures of
elements which are in disequilibrium.
It follows that Chai-Anàn - like the other
contributors to this project - is suspicious of the
teleological thinking that characterises the work of
both thpolitical dévelopment' and the 'dependency'
schools, and of many whose main concern is the role of
politics in economic development. He argues that
events tend to proceed not in a unilinear direction, but
in a less predictable, less constant manner.
Sudipta Kaviraj's article also focuses on the way in
which the state and society are conceptualised and
talked about, but he is interested not only in how
political analysts think and write, but in how ordinary
citizens see their polity and society. His paper deals
with one case, India, and - like many others that
emerged from the Berlin conference - it traces
changes that have occurred over time, since the days of
M. K. Gandhi. He does so partly because he is
dissatisfied with the ahistorical and excessively
economistic perceptions of social and political change
which have loomed large in discussions of India.
His complex argument defies summation, but a few of
his ideas deserve mention here. He identifies what he
regards as theoretical faults in recent discourse,
misperceptions that reveal concrete, structural
problems in India's state-society relations. He argues
that the state has remained largely external to society
since independence, despite the huge extension of the
state machinery. He believes that this externality is the
result of the failure of political elites to reconstitute the
popular understanding of politics. Had they knitted
the new conceptual vocabulary concerning rights,
institutions, impersonal power, secularism, etc., into
everyday vernacular discourse, had they created a
single political language for the entire polity, then
state and society, and elites and mass would have been
more adequately integrated.
The enormous growth of the state has necessitated the
recruitment of large numbers of personnel to work at
lower levels of the system who see and interpret the
political world in terms of a different, popular
discourse. The result is that arguments in favour of
reform and social justice are used as justifications for
nepotism and corruption. So, as Indian politics
becomes more democratic in the sense that it comes
increasingly into line with what most ordinary Indians
consider reasonable, it conforms less to the principles
of a secular, democratic state as articulated, for
example, by Nehru. Kaviraj is suggesting - among
other things - that theory and discourse not only
reveal how politics works, but that changes in theory
and discourse can make a material difference in the
workings of politics.
Rudolph Wagner's paper on the crisis which
culminated in the killings around Tiananmen Square
in June, 1989 also assesses the relationship between
institutional structures and political discourse. He
focuses on the way in which the weakness of official
institutions renders formal political discourse unreal
and thwarts any attempts by organised social groups
to engage in dialogue with those in political control.
He begins by demonstrating that the institutional
structures of both the state and the Chinese
Communist Party, which Deng Xiaoping and his
reformist colleagues claimed to be (and at first, were)
strengthening from 1978 onwards, proved to be
insubstantial amid the economic and political crises of
the late l980s. The circle of aged leaders round Deng
were able to use their personalised networks of clients
to brush these institutions aside and to take control by
deploying lethal force. Whatever institution-building
had occurred since 1978 was swiftly undone.
This wrecked any chance of dialogue between the
young people of Tiananmen and those in political
control. It reduced the two sides to talking past one
another by manipulating symbols and discourse in
highly theatrical exercises. This carries Wagner into a
discussion of the theatrical and imaginery dimensions
of politics - a major concern of our Berlin
conference.
This collection concludes with two detailed analyses of
political practice, forces and institutions, which turn
out to be crucially important in shaping developmental
outcomes. Both reach beyond politics to these nations'
economies and to state-society relations. Both place
political institutions in their historical contexts. Both
are empirical studies of what has happened, not of
how things ought to be or might unfold in a
teleological pattern. And yet both contain useful
material for those who might wish to devise rational
future policies. Both illuminate the particularities of
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individual cases while focusing, in varying degrees, on
comparisons with other cases.
Richard Crook's article carries us across the barrier
separating Anglophone and Francophone African
states by comparing Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, two
countries which share many common features but
whose histories since independence have diverged. He
argues that the conventional explanation for this
divergence, which stresses contrasting economic
policies, is less convincing than one which focuses on
state-society relations and state capacity. Endemic
political instability in Ghana has undermined the
ability of successive governments to implement any
economic policy. Cote d'Ivoire, by contrast, has
experienced much greater stability which has made it
possible for the Houphouet Boigny regime that has
ruled throughout to control, tax and yet encourage the
expansion of peasant export and trading economies.
Crook - who again demonstrates our concern with
the recent historical trajectories of Third World
polities - focuses on the differences between Ivorian
and Ghanaian societies, and between the processes of
political elite - and state-formation in the two
countries. These have resulted in marked differences
in the relative 'balance' and 'proportion' between state
and civil society. Cote d'Ivoire has managed to
exclude most of Ivorian society from the political
community, and has created an administrative and
security machine which is out of all proportion to the
small size and weakness of civil society. In Ghâna, civil
society has always been numerically larger, more
autonomous and far better organised. The Ghanaian
state, despite being more thoroughly integrated with
civil society than its Ivorian counterpart, has not been
able to maintain sufficient autonomy from or control
over civil society to implement policies effectively.
In saying this, however, Crook is not rejecting the view
that the development of civil society and of a state
rooted in it is a healthy trend. He believes that over the
long term, Ghana's state may be better able to cope
with stresses of the kind which will arise in Cote
d'Ivoire over political succession, and better able to
make creative innovations such as the establishment
of decentralised political structures now being
attempted than will the Ivorian state. The political
stability that the latter has maintained has entailed the
smothering of civic consciousness which has caused
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citizens to view the state as an alien entity. Such
citizens will be more difficult to draw into productive
interaction with the state than will their counterparts
in Ghana.
Finally, Christopher Clapham's paper on the
transformation of political institutions in revolutionary
Ethiopia concentrates on the uses and limitations of
the Leninist model for the achievement of state
consolidation. He argues that it is less helpful to
regard the Ethiopian experiment as an attempt to
apply socialist solutions to the intractable problems
facing African states than to see the Leninism, more
specifically, as a means of forging the state into a
centralised and disciplined structure of political
control. The Ethiopian leaders have largely succeeded
in this effort, in contrast to most other allegedly
'revolutionary' African regimes. The resulting state is
not a personalised power structure as are so many
others in the Third World - including, in Wagner's
view, Deng's China.
Some notable achievements have followed. Highly
effective structures of rural and urban government
have been built. An equitable system of landholding
has been established, education has been expanded
and literacy has risen sharply. Even the regional
movements in Tigray and Eritrea have adopted these
reforms, in their drive to throw off the rule of the
central government.
Ethiopia's centralised state structure has also been a
source of basic failures, however, as the existence of
these regional movements suggests. Ever more
rigorous central control has not been an adequate
answer to regional diversity. Nor has a centrally
directed economy revived an ailing economy. Indeed,
its inefficiencies have done damage, especially in the
agricultural sector. The fragile economic base appears
incapable of sustaining the huge state apparatus that
has been erected. The central problem, then, in
Ethiopia - unlike most of sub-Saharan Africa - is
not to create an effective structure of power, but to
make creative use of it. The challenge, in this country
with a long tradition of government from the top, is to
find ways of permitting enough participation and
accommodation to enable the state to survive regional
and other challenges - a task for which the Leninist
model is ill-equipped.
